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37 Individual rights and transnational networks
Francesca Bignami
Today the paradigm of public policymaking is global, not simply national or local. Rules 
and standards are decided, fi scal and macroeconomic policy is determined, and policy 
commitments are enforced through regional and global institutions that have simulta-
neously built upon and transformed their national bureaucratic counterparts. Some of 
these institutions are traditional international organizations and tribunals, which have 
proliferated and expanded over recent years. Yet transnational regulatory networks, in 
which decisionmaking occurs through routine contacts among national civil servants, 
are quickly becoming the primary institutional vehicle through which cross- national 
policymaking occurs.
Networks marry domestic bureaucratic capacity with transnational policy ambitions 
and thus fall at the intersection of a number of disciplines: administrative, criminal, and 
constitutional law, international law, public policy studies and international relations 
theory. These diff erent research traditions have begun to raise and off er answers to a 
number of important questions about the nature and promise of regulatory networks: 
Under what circumstances do states choose to cooperate through networks as opposed 
to international organizations and more traditional international institutions (Raustiala 
2002, Eilstrup- Sangiovanni 2009)? Relatedly, what are the advantages and disadvan-
tages of networks over more traditional forms of international cooperation (Slaughter 
2004, Verdier 2009, Zaring 1998)? Under what circumstances can this form of transna-
tional cooperation be expected to generate international convergence or other types of 
policy outcomes (Singer 2007)? And what types of public law metrics should be used 
to evaluate regulatory networks and how has the experience so far measured up to the 
chosen normative metric (Kingsbury et al. 2005, Slaughter 2004)?
In this short contribution, I off er some refl ections on the last question. I focus on the 
interplay between classic liberal rights and network decisions that implicate personal 
freedom, property rights, and other basic interests. Safeguarding rights against arbitrary 
government action is one of the oldest concerns of public law – constitutional, criminal, 
and administrative – and therefore is necessarily at the heart of any attempt at the nor-
mative reconstruction of global governance via networks. Yet most scholarly analysis 
of transnational networks has tended to emphasize the agenda- setting and rulemaking 
activities of networks and the problem of network accountability to the broader public 
through transparency, the consultation of aff ected interests, and other devices (see, for 
example, Slaughter 2004). This is obviously a subject of critical importance, both because 
agenda- setting and rulemaking are core network activities and because public account-
ability in a globalized world raises diffi  cult and novel questions about the relationship 
between conventional accounts of democracy and the new political terrain of globaliza-
tion (see, for example, Lindseth 2006). Nonetheless, the analytically distinct aspiration of 
safeguarding individual rights triggers an important and distinct set of issues. By shifting 
the normative focus to this aspect of network activity, I seek to bring together a number 
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of experiences from a variety of institutional settings to illustrate the unique issues that 
arise in protecting rights in the expanding domain of transnational networks.
The rest of this contribution proceeds as follows. In the next section, I off er a defi ni-
tion of transnational networks and give some examples of the phenomenon, with partic-
ular attention to those that can result in individualized determinations that aff ect liberty, 
property, and other types of interests. Any type of policy determination can have impli-
cations for rights, but when the institutional landscape is as fl uid as with transnational 
networks, courts only tend to get involved and rights challenges brought at the point in 
the policymaking chain at which a concrete decision, aff ecting an individual or set of 
individuals, has been taken. In the third section, which contains the bulk of the analysis, 
I point to the diffi  culties triggered by the core characteristic of networks – the dispersion 
of decisionmaking power across government units. In particular, I discuss the issues that 
have arisen in the EU legal system, which has a long experience with networks designed 
to apply and enforce common EU policies. The conclusion suggests how this EU experi-
ence is relevant for transnational networks that operate in other international regimes.
Defi ning regulatory networks
In the international law and international relations literature, transnational networks 
are generally defi ned in opposition to classic treaty regimes (Eilstrup- Sangiovanni 2009, 
Verdier 2009). In this characterization, the actors are regulators that deal with specifi c 
policy problems, not heads of government and offi  cials charged with representing the 
national interest abroad, generally located in foreign ministries. The legal instruments 
in which they set down their course of action are soft, informal documents such as 
memoranda of understanding, letters of intent, and common guidelines, not formal legal 
instruments such as international treaties. Network meetings and exchanges of informa-
tion are conducted as necessity dictates, not set down in advance in formal treaties or 
fi xed at the conclusion of international conferences of the parties. And, in contrast with 
the elaborate set of institutions and decisionmaking procedures that characterize tradi-
tional international organizations, networks often do not have any offi  cial voting rules or 
membership criteria; rather they proceed informally, generally by consensus and with the 
national confi guration that tradition, practice, and functional necessity dictate.
More recently, however, a number of scholars have argued that transnational net-
works are often embedded in the more formal decisionmaking structures of traditional 
international organizations and therefore their structural and output characteristics 
cannot be as neatly contrasted with those of formal treaty regimes as was originally sug-
gested (Slaughter and Zaring 2006). Moreover, they have noted the tendency for tran-
snational networks to quickly morph into more routinized forms of organization that 
betray many of the same characteristics as classic international organizations (Zaring 
2005). This understanding of global networks comes closer to the understanding of 
networks that prevails in research on the European Union. The work of a number of 
scholars, including several contributions to this volume (for example, that of Johannes 
Saurer), demonstrates that regulatory networks are omnipresent in the EU (Bignami 
2005a, Cassese 2004, Chiti 2004, della Cananea 2004). As the Saurer chapter suggests, 
in many ways, the modus operandi of these EU regulatory networks is no diff erent from 
that of traditional international institutions: they are generally established by formal 
legal instruments such as EU directives and regulations, their decisionmaking rules 
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and procedures are fi xed in advance, and their regulatory output can range from soft 
 opinions to legally binding decisions.
What, then, is distinctive about transnational networks as compared to other types 
of international institutions? The answer rests in the practice of making and enforc-
ing policy by way of routine contacts among civil servants in diff erent countries, civil 
servants who are embedded in diff erent bureaucracies and constitutional systems and 
who are tasked with managing specifi c policy areas both internally and externally. This 
sets transnational networks apart from high- level decisionmaking by heads of state, 
classically associated with international treaties, because in the latter case, the interna-
tional component of policymaking is sporadic and control over policymaking is largely 
retained by national offi  cials, with only occasional incursions from the broad directives 
contained in international treaties and the decisions of international tribunals. This also 
sets the work of transnational networks apart from that of international secretariats, 
which are generally staff ed by career offi  cials, have their own fi nancial resources, and 
undertake their mission much as any centralized bureaucracy would. Transnational net-
works are characterized by the routine exchange of bureaucratic capacity and resources 
across state borders and for this reason, the policymaking process can be expected to be 
systematically diff erent from other forms of international decisionmaking.
What types of networks are most likely to raise concerns related to fundamental 
rights? Of course, any type of policy decision taken by a transnational network, includ-
ing those establishing general rules and programs, can tread upon fundamental rights. 
Thus, for instance, a (hypothetical) decision of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision to establish a formula limiting the compensation of bankers would implicate 
the property interests of bankers. Similarly, changes to the Europol databank, through 
which national police exchange information on criminal suspects in the European 
Union, might very well implicate privacy rights. Yet the basic right to be free of arbitrary 
government determinations arises in the context of individualized decisionmaking, and 
in many legal systems, especially one as fl uid as the international one, the opportunity to 
vindicate other fundamental rights such as the property and privacy interests just men-
tioned, most commonly presents itself in the context of an individual decision applied to 
a specifi c person or set of persons. Thus an analysis of the fundamental rights implica-
tions of transnational networks should, at the very least, begin with those networks that 
are involved in the process of making individualized determinations.
Enforcement networks most clearly fi t this bill. They can involve the enforcement of 
classic regulatory policies, such as transatlantic cooperation on antitrust enforcement 
(Piilola 2003, Whytock 2005). They can also entail intelligence exchange, designed to 
facilitate the detention and arrest of suspects, by law enforcement and national security 
offi  cials through bilateral arrangements and multilateral frameworks such as Interpol 
(Savino 2009) and Europol (Peers 2008). And there are many other examples, too 
 numerous to review here.
Safeguarding rights in transnational networks
The operation of transnational enforcement and other types of networks has given rise 
to new puzzles for those committed to safeguarding individual rights against arbitrary 
government action. The central diffi  culty is the separation, in the network form of 
organization, between the government bodies responsible for collecting information and 
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making policy decisions, and the national authority that ultimately takes the decision to 
arrest a suspect, freeze assets, impose a customs duty, or deny a subsidy. Due process, 
before and after such a decision is taken, is the main mechanism that the criminal and 
administrative law of liberal democracies has developed to keep check on policemen and 
bureaucrats and to ensure respect for a variety of fundamental rights when state author-
ity is exercised. But these guarantees have not been systematically built into the tran-
snational network form of organization, largely because of the old mindset of divided 
international and domestic spheres: in this account, the international sphere governs 
relations between states, the domestic one governs relations among individual citizens 
and between citizens and states. Therefore, because the very notion of individual rights 
and duties turns on citizenship in a national community, the protection of these rights 
and duties can only be aff orded by the domestic rule- of- law institutions of the state.
Although this outlook might have suffi  ced in the past, when international coopera-
tion was more sporadic and did not routinely enter into the details of individual cases, 
today it has generated a series of conundrums for the national offi  cials charged with 
acting upon the information and decisions generated by transnational networks and the 
national courts tasked with checking those offi  cials: should they automatically act upon 
the information and decisions generated by transnational networks, on the assumption 
that, at some point, individual rights and interests have been considered and adequately 
addressed? After all, to the extent that the participating network offi  cials operate in the 
broader context of constitutional democracies, they can be expected to abide by funda-
mental rights guarantees. If not, and the executing national authorities decide to review 
the grounds for the determination independently, how can they guarantee the integrity 
of the review process when the bulk of the decisionmaking was handled by government 
agencies that escape their jurisdiction?
This problem of how and at what point in the transnational decisionmaking process 
to aff ord rights protection has recently come to fore with the UN Security Council’s 
initiatives to combat terrorism. As is well known, in the late 1990s, the Security Council 
established a committee to administer a sanctions regime against individuals and entities 
associated with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network, and the Taliban. The process 
by which individuals and entities are listed and their assets then frozen is typical of a 
transnational enforcement network: domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
communicate information on terrorism suspects to the national offi  cials on the Sanctions 
Committee, this transnational committee then decides by consensus to place those sus-
pects on an offi  cial list, at which point law national offi  cials everywhere are under a duty 
to freeze the assets of the suspects that fall within their jurisdiction. The diffi  culty of 
aff ording adequate rights protection has been compounded by the policy area involved 
– counter- terrorism – and the secrecy that attends this area, confounding vigorous rights 
guarantees even when government action is exclusively domestic. Nonetheless, the dilem-
mas that the UN sanctions regime has created for the national bureaucracies and courts 
asked to freeze assets are typical of transnational enforcement networks more broadly 
speaking: can these national actors trust the network players to comply with fundamen-
tal rights guarantees, making their decisions worthy of enforcement, notwithstanding the 
protests of the individual concerned – in the case of the Sanctions Committee, the domes-
tic intelligence agency that initially communicated the information and urged the listing, 
as well as the collective decision of the Sanctions Committee? If national rule- of- law 
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institutions decide to go ahead and independently assess the rights claims, how can they 
overcome the handicap of one- step- removed information- gathering and decisionmak-
ing and organize an eff ective review process? On the fi rst question, the Supreme Court 
of Switzerland decided to defer to the UN network (Reich 2008), but not the European 
Court of Justice, which held in the Kadi case1 that the EU must independently aff ord due 
process rights for targeted individuals and entities (de Búrca 2009, della Cananea 2009). 
Now, however, the EU is faced with the second question of how to guarantee eff ective 
rights protection: due process requires that the terrorist suspects be able to contest the 
evidence used against them, but it is highly unlikely that either the Sanctions Committee 
or the United States, which originally requested the Kadi listing, will turn over the 
 evidence to the European Commission, especially given its sensitive nature.
Although the UN Security Council’s sanctions proceedings have recently brought 
attention to the diffi  culty of rights protections in transnational networks, it is by no 
means an isolated or novel phenomenon. Very similar issues are faced by intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies that exchange information for purposes of detaining indi-
viduals, making arrests, and freezing assets through bilateral arrangements or through 
international organizations like Interpol (Savino 2009). In the European Union, the frag-
mentation of decisionmaking power in enforcement networks has given rise to a directly 
related set of conundrums, which have been worked out in the case law of the European 
Court of Justice for over thirty years now. In the EU, the structure of the rights issue 
is slightly diff erent because the decisions of EU institutions are subject to review by a 
central court – the European Court of Justice – in marked contrast to other international 
institutions like the UN Security Council and Europol. Two sets of issues have arisen in 
the EU context: how to allocate responsibility for judicial review of network decisions 
between national courts and the European Court of Justice and what fundamental rights 
law to apply to network decisions.
The puzzle of how to allocate jurisdiction between national courts and the European 
Court of Justice is directly connected to the dispersion of power among national regula-
tors, the European Commission, and transnational committees of national regulators 
in networked policymaking. This issue has arisen mostly in the areas of agriculture and 
customs administration, where the decision to grant or withhold an agricultural subsidy 
or apply or waive a customs duty is the product of a particularly complex decisionmak-
ing sequence involving national bureaucrats, the European Commission, and EU com-
mittees formed of national regulators (della Cananea 2004). The Court of Justice has 
held that individuals only have a right to challenge administrative decisions at the point 
at which they are ‘directly aff ected’ by the decision, meaning that there is no discretion 
left to the administrative authority to depart from the adverse outcome feared by the 
challenger.2 The result is that most challenges are brought in national courts, against 
local agricultural and customs authorities, because even though their decisions are 
based on the information and policies transmitted through the relevant EU network, it 
is the local bureaucrat that has the last say on whether to deny the subsidy or impose 
the customs duty. If, however, the national court wishes to overturn the administrative 
1 Joined cases C- 402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, ECR 
I- 6351.
2 See, for example, Case T- 33/01, Infront WM AG v. Commission, 2005 ECR II- 5897.
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decision, it is obliged to refer questions of EU law, including challenges to the net-
work’s regulatory framework, to the Court of Justice, through the preliminary reference 
system.3 This division of jurisdiction strikes a balance between distributing the task of 
safeguarding rights duties broadly, among all national courts, while at the same time 
retaining central control over the application of EU law and thus remaining faithful to 
the principle of equality. Yet it is not without its fl aws: the test for allocating jurisdiction 
is fairly complex and therefore litigants face real uncertainty in deciding in what court 
to challenge the decisions of enforcement networks; it is unclear whether local courts are 
capable of fully reviewing the complex sequence of decisions that results in individual-
ized determinations; and, if a preliminary reference is required, the time for obtaining an 
answer from the Court of Justice can be as much as two years.
The interplay between liberal rights and the decisions of enforcement networks has 
given rise to a second set of issues: what are the fundamental rights to be guaranteed by 
national courts and, in some instances, by the European Court of Justice when reviewing 
network enforcement decisions? Those guaranteed under the national constitution of 
the reviewing court or those guaranteed under EU law? And if the fundamental rights 
law of the EU applies, how is the content of that law to be determined? This is obviously 
a rich and complex debate, developed in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and 
national courts over decades and directly related to the question of supremacy. Suffi  ce it 
to say that while national courts have come, for the most part, to accept that EU rights 
prevail, the content of those rights has been shaped by national traditions because of 
the interdependent nature of authority, both judicial and bureaucratic, and the need to 
accommodate diff erent public law traditions in a governance structure based on policy 
networks. It is no coincidence that many of the early Court of Justice cases setting down 
constitutional principles such as human dignity, proportionality, and the right to prop-
erty involved references from German administrative courts, exercising their power of 
review over network decisions and operating in the domestic context of a strong con-
stitutional court. Likewise, as I have argued elsewhere, the due process rights that are 
aff orded in individualized administrative proceedings have been shaped by the English 
tradition of natural justice by virtue of the same institutional logic of interdependent 
government authority (Bignami 2005b).
Conclusion
With this brief review of the experience with safeguarding liberal rights in the face of 
transnational networks, I have sought to highlight a couple of the key public law dilem-
mas that have arisen in the administration of networks. The dispersion of responsibility 
for decisionmaking has given rise to similar issues across diff erent international regimes 
– the United Nations, the European Union, Interpol, and many others – such as the 
diffi  culty of protecting rights nationally when much of the information giving rise to 
administrative action is generated elsewhere. By the same token, EU networks raise a 
distinct set of issues compared to other transnational enforcement networks because they 
are policed by a combination of national courts and a central judicial body. Yet recently, 
some have urged the UN Sanctions Committee to establish a centralized process 
3 See, for example, Case 314/85, Foto- Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck- Ost, 1987 ECR 4199.
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involving an independent, expert panel through which terrorist suspects could petition 
for de- listing (Keller and Fischer 2009: 266). Similar calls can be heard for establishing 
centralized review of red alerts – the equivalent of arrest warrants – issued through the 
Europol information system (Savino 2009). Thus we might expect some of the same 
problems, related to the allocation of jurisdiction between national and supranational 
courts and to the creation of a common body of fundamental rights, to emerge in the 
public law of other transnational networks too.
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